Case Law

In Sparf & Hansen v. United States (1895), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the role of juries in determining legal questions. The Court held that federal judges are not obligated to inform juries of their inherent ability to judge both the law and the facts in a case, effectively limiting the practice of jury nullification. This 5-4 decision emphasized that while juries have the power to deliver general verdicts, they should receive the law from the court and apply it as instructed, thereby delineating the boundaries between judicial authority and jury discretion.

In United States v. Moylan (1969), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that juries possess the power to acquit defendants regardless of the law and evidence—a concept known as jury nullification. However, the court upheld the trial judge's decision to prohibit defense counsel from informing the jury about this power, emphasizing that while juries can nullify, neither the court nor attorneys are obligated to instruct jurors on this ability. This case underscores the judiciary's recognition of jury nullification as an inherent jury power, albeit one that should not be actively encouraged or explained during trials.

In United States v. Dougherty (1972), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed whether juries should be explicitly informed of their power to nullify the law. The appellants, members of the "D.C. Nine," had been convicted of vandalizing a Dow Chemical Company office as an anti-war protest. They contended that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury on jury nullification and by restricting related arguments. The court upheld the convictions, ruling that while juries have the power to acquit against the law and evidence, judges are not required to inform them of this power.

In United States v. Thomas (1997), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the dismissal of a juror suspected of intending to nullify the law during a federal narcotics trial. Juror No. 5 was removed after fellow jurors reported his reluctance to convict, allegedly based on preconceived notions rather than the trial evidence. The appellate court upheld the dismissal, ruling that a juror may be removed if there is clear evidence that the juror is unwilling to apply the law as instructed. This case underscores the judiciary's stance against jury nullification when it conflicts with legal obligations.

Bushell’s Case (1670) established the principle that jurors cannot be punished for delivering verdicts based on their conscience. The case arose when Edward Bushell, a juror, refused to convict Quaker preacher William Penn for unlawful assembly despite judicial pressure. The court fined and imprisoned Bushell and his fellow jurors for delivering a verdict contrary to instructions. Upon appeal, Chief Justice Vaughan ruled that jurors must remain free to render decisions without fear of reprisal, emphasizing their independence. This landmark ruling is foundational to the concept of jury nullification, affirming the jury’s role as a safeguard against legal and governmental overreach.

In People v. Williams (2001), the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of jury nullification during a trial involving charges of statutory rape. Juror No. 10 was dismissed after expressing an unwillingness to apply the law, stating personal disagreement with the statute criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse with a minor. The court upheld the juror's dismissal, emphasizing that jurors are obligated to follow the law as instructed and do not possess the right to nullify legal statutes based on personal beliefs. This decision reinforced the principle that jury nullification is not sanctioned under California law.

In Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial is fundamental and, through the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to the states. Gary Duncan, a 19-year-old African American, was convicted of simple battery in Louisiana—a misdemeanor punishable by up to two years in prison—without being granted a jury trial. The Court ruled that for serious offenses, defined as those punishable by more than six months' imprisonment, defendants are entitled to a jury trial, thereby reinforcing the role of juries as essential protectors of individual liberties within the justice system.

In Georgia v. Brailsford (1794), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a dispute over ownership of debts involving the State of Georgia and British creditors. Chief Justice John Jay, in his instructions to the jury, emphasized that while jurors must respect judicial guidance, they also have the authority to determine both the facts and the law. This acknowledgment highlighted the jury's role as a safeguard against unjust applications of the law. The case is often cited in discussions of jury nullification, as it reflects the early recognition of the jury’s capacity to exercise independent judgment in matters of law and justice.

In Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Louisiana's practice of excluding women from jury service unless they had previously filed a written declaration violated a defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Billy J. Taylor, convicted by an all-male jury, argued that this exclusion denied him a fair trial by a representative cross-section of the community. The Court agreed, overturning its prior decision in Hoyt v. Florida (1961), and emphasized that systematic exclusion of distinctive groups from juries undermines the impartiality and legitimacy of the judicial process.

During the Prohibition era (1920–1933), widespread jury nullification occurred as jurors frequently acquitted defendants charged with violating alcohol laws under the 18th Amendment and the Volstead Act. Many jurors viewed these laws as unjust, intrusive, or inconsistent with societal norms, particularly in urban areas. Acquittals, despite clear evidence of guilt, undermined enforcement efforts and highlighted the public's resistance to Prohibition policies. Jury nullification during this period demonstrated the jury's role as a safeguard against unpopular or oppressive laws, contributing to the eventual repeal of Prohibition through the 21st Amendment in 1933.